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Abstract— The paper presents a new approach for control
security. Specifically, cyber-attacks on the controller are in-
vestigated by means of optimization techniques in order to
determine the worst-case scenario. Then, a novel attack detector
based on limit checking is introduced. The particularity of this
detector is that no specific controller knowledge is necessary.
Hence, the vulnerability of the detector can be reduced since
no reconfiguration is required (limited accessibility). Finally, the
paper shows that the effect of the attacks on the system can
be significantly mitigated by applying proper optimal control
laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, control devices are interconnected trough the
process control network which, in turn, is connected to exter-
nal networks such as Internet. This poses several problems in
terms of security, especially when the process under control
is safety critical. In fact, several cases of cyber-attacks on
critical controlled plants have already been reported (e.g. [1],
[2]). As pointed out in [3], the traditional tools from com-
puter security may not be sufficient or suitable for controlled
systems. Therefore, novel methods exploiting knowledge of
the controller and the plant need to be developed [4], [5].
Recent works address the security on control systems by
means of control-based techniques. For instance, new control
schemes are designed in [6] and [7] in order to handle
different attacks.
Up to now, the attack scenarios considered in control
system security are based on plant-controller communication
disruption. In a networked control system, the sent and
received data in the control loop is blocked or modified by
the attacker. See [8] for a good overview on attack scenarios.
In this paper, a new attack scenario is studied. Based on the
Stuxnet case [1] where a controller was reprogrammed, we
specially focus on the case wherein the controller is hijacked
an a harmful control signal is injected into the control loop.
A typical approach to deal with cyber-attacks, adopted by
the majority of the works devoted to control system security,
is to implement attack detectors based on system models (e.g.
[9], [10]). Inspired by fault diagnosis detectors [11], [12], the
basic idea is to use a model of the system in order to validate
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Fig. 1. Basic approach to detect attacks on the controller.
whether the actual system behavior corresponds to the attack-
free behavior, or else to some sort of attack. Usually, this is
applied to a dynamic process where model uncertainties are
handled by observer design techniques [13]. It should not
be difficult, since a controller is indeed a dynamic system,
to apply the same approach for cyber-attacks targeting the
controller. A representative block diagram of this approach
applied to an attacked controller is shown in Fig. 1. It should
be noted that this approach must provide good results since
reliable, if not exact, controller models are easy to obtain.
However, this poses some security problems as it will be
next discussed.
One of the largest advantages of having controllers con-
nected to the network is that they can be remotely reconfig-
ured or tuned by control and plant engineers. By adopting the
mentioned approach (depicted in Fig. 1), the detector should
be also modified accordingly every time the controller is
modified. Consequently, the same level of accessibility needs
to be available for both the controller and the detector, which
in turn implies that the controller vulnerabilities are somehow
inhered by the detector. Therefore, there are good reasons
to believe that this approach is not suitable since potential
attacks could target both, the controller and the detector, at
the same time.
To face this problem, this paper presents a novel approach
for detecting attacks on the controller with the particularity
that no prior controller information is needed (no controller
model-based detector). Therefore, this new detector does not
need to be adjusted every time that the controller is modified.
Consequently, the detector can be implemented with a very
limited accessibility (e.g. no outside access or reconfiguration
are allowed), and thus with a high protection degree against
attacks. For these reasons, it will be assumed that the detector
can not be attacked in this case.
In this paper, safety limits on the measured variables
will be considered to validate whether the plant is working
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properly. The limit checking technique is widely used in
industry to detect malfunctions and problems, since it is
simple and free of models [14]. The limits are typically fixed
beforehand, and then an alarm is triggered when one of the
measurement crosses its corresponding limit. In addition, it
will be assumed that a backup controller is available, thus
the hijacked controller can instantaneously be replaced by
the backup controller.
Besides the new attack detector scheme, the paper also
presents a preliminary study of the worst-case attack as well
as an optimal control with the aim to mitigate the attack
effect once it has been detected. This study is based on
the system model and carried out by means of optimization
techniques. It is important to emphasize that no model
uncertainty, and neither perturbation, is considered. Conse-
quently, no feedback is taken into consideration. In case of
necessity, it should not be difficult to overcome this lack
of feedback by extending the present study to constrained
optimal control techniques such as model-predictive control
[15] or multiparametric optimal control [16]. The objective
of this study is twofold: 1) demonstrate that the ideal case
of a backup controller is not sufficient to handle attacks, and
2) motivate that significant improvements can be obtained if
suitable optimal controls are used.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
A small and simple example will be used throughout the
paper with the objective to have a better understanding of
the context. The results provided by this example are quite
intuitive and highlight the benefits of the proposed approach.
Nevertheless, the approach is not limited to this example
and can be straightforwardly extended to more complex and
larger systems.
The example consists of a one-dimensional moving cart
whose horizontal position needs to be controlled (see Fig. 2).
The system obeys the Newton’s second law and is modeled
in continuous time as
d2y(t)
dt2
= u(t)
where unitary mass is choosen for simplicity. The corre-
sponding discrete state space model for this system is[
x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
]
=
[
1 0
1 1
] [
x1(k)
x2(k)
]
+
[
1 · 10−2
5 · 10−3
]
u(k)
(1a)
y(k) =
[
0 1
] [ x1(k)
x2(k)
]
(1b)
where x1 and x2 represent the velocity and the position of the
cart, respectively. The sample time of both, the cart system
and the controller is set to Ts = 0.1 seconds. It is important
to point out that the actuator range is limited to the interval
[u− u+] = [−1 1] and the cart should move inside the
position interval [y− y+] = [−5 5] for safety reasons.
A PID controller is used to control the cart position
whereas a standard monitoring system checks that the po-
sition does not exceed the limits. The PID controller is
Fig. 2. Cart system.
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Fig. 3. Typical cart and PID controller responses.
represented by the following discrete transfer function
u(k) =
(
KP +KI
Ts
z − 1
+KD
z − 1
z − (1− Ts)
)
e(k) (2)
where KP = 2.48 · 10−2, KI = 9.35 · 10−5 and KD =
1.96 · 10−1 are the proportional, integral and derivative coef-
ficients. The error input signal is fed back as e(k) = −y(k),
since the set-point position is 0.
Figure 3 shows typical system responses when cart ini-
tially rests at y(0) = 4 and the PID controller drives it to
the zero position. Note that no limit is crossed.
III. ATTACK ANALYSIS
Before presenting the attack detector, the worst-case attack
scenario is analyzed in this section by means of optimization
techniques.
Assume that an attacker hijacks the controller and is
able to replace the control variable by any other signal of
length Na. Without a loss of generality, it will be also
assumed that the attack starts at time instant t = 0, i.e.
ua(0), . . . , ua(Na − 1), and it will be detected at t = Na.
The goal of the attacker is to compromise system security
by forcing a measured variable to cross the safety limit and
to violate the limits as far as possible while satifying the
actuator ranges at the same time. Furthermore, for the sake
of simplicity, it is assumed that once a limit is crossed, the
attack is instantaneously rejected and a backup controller
with same structure and parameters as the attacked controller
is connected to the system in order to recover it. Hence, the
attack analysis can be divided into two parts:
1) Attack perpetration: The attacker performs the attack
by introducing a signal ua while it remains undetected.
The system response for this part can be calculated by
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x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bua(k) (3a)
y(k) = Cx(k) +Dua(k) (3b)
for k = {0, · · · , Na − 1}.
2) Attack effect: The attack has already been detected and
rejected which means that now the system is driven by
the back up controller. In this case, a state feedback
control law u(k) = −Kx(k) is chosen to represent
a generic backup controller. A time horizon of Ne
steps has been considered for the system response in
this part. Thus, the system can be represented by the
following autonomous system,
x(k + 1) = (A−BK)x(k) (4a)
y(k) = Cx(k) (4b)
for k = {Na + 1, · · · , Na +Ne − 1}
Taking into account (3) and (4), the worst attack scenario
is computed by means of the following optimization problem,
max
ua(0),...,ua(Na−1)
yi(Na +Ne − 1)
T yi(Na +Ne − 1) (5a)
subject to:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bua(k) (5b)
y(k) = Cx(k) +Dua(k) (5c)
for k = {0, · · · , Na − 1}
x(k + 1) = (A−BK)x(k) (5d)
y(k) = Cx(k) (5e)
for k = {Na, · · · , Na +Ne − 1}
ua(0), . . . , ua(Na − 1) ∈ [u
− u+] (5f)
y(0), . . . , y(Na − 1) ∈ [y
− y+] (5g)
The solution of this optimization problem ensures a maxi-
mum value of the measured variable yi ∈ y at time instant
t = Na +Ne − 1.
The constraints of the optimization problem in (5) can
straightforwardly be rewritten by extending (3a) and (4a).
Hence, it holds that
x(k) = Akx(0) +
[
Ak−1B · · · AB B
]


ua(0)
.
.
.
ua(k − 1)


(6)
for any k ∈ {0, · · · , Na − 1}, and
x(k) = (A−BK)k−Nax(Na) (7)
for any k ∈ {Na, · · · , Na+Ne−1}. From (4b), (6) and (7),
the outputs of the system at time t = Na + Ne − 1 can be
computed as
y(Na +Ne − 1) = Px(0) +QUa (8)
where
P = C
(
A−BK
)Ne−1
ANa
Q = C
(
A−BK
)Ne−1 [
ANa−1B · · · AB B
]
Ua =
[
ua(0) · · · ua(Na − 1)
]T
Similarly, the system outputs for k = {0, · · · , Na − 1},
i.e. Y = [y(0) · · · y(Na − 1)]T , can be computed as
Y = Gxx(k) + GuUa (9)
where
Gx =


C
CA
.
.
.
CANa−1

 , Gu =


D 0 · · · 0
CB D · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
CANa−2B CANa−3B · · · D


Finally, the optimization problem in (5) can be reformu-
lated as a standard quadratic optimization problem, i.e.
max
Ua
UTa Q
T
i QiUa + 2x(0)
TPTi QiUa + x(0)
TPTi Pix(0)
(10a)
subject to: 

−Gu
Gu
−I
I

Ua ≤


−Y− + Gxx(k)
Y+ − Gxx(k)
−U−
U+

 (10b)
where Pi and Qi denote the ith-row of the matrices P and
Q. Matrix I is an identity matrix of the dimension (Na− 1)
while Y−, Y+, U− and U+ are vectors of the dimension
(Na − 1) containing the limit values y−, y+ , u− and u+,
respectively.
A. Example: optimal cart attack
The solution to problem (10) is applied to the cart system
described in Section II. It is assumed that the cart rests at
the set-point, i.e. x(k) = [0 0]T at the start of the attack.
The goal of the attack is that the cart reaches the maximum
distance from the set-point.
The attack horizon is experimentally set to Na = 89 steps
which corresponds to a time horizon of 8.9 seconds. It is
important to note that this is the minimum time required to
achieve the attack goal (a larger horizon does not increase
the maximum distance, while a shorter horizon is too short
time to reach the maximum). Besides, the effect of the attack
after the detection has been computed for a time horizon of
Ne = 55. In this specific example, the same results would
be obtained for an arbitrary time horizon.
Figure 4 shows the solution to the optimization problem
and its effects. The solution, quite intuitive, consists of
driving the cart to one limit position and then speed it up until
the other limit is crossed. At this moment (t = 8.9 seconds),
an alarm is triggered and the attack perpetration phase is
finished. The attack is instantly rejected and the backup PID
controller takes the control in order to recover the system
from the attack. However, the recovery action results in the
position y = 16.74 at t = 14.4 seconds, which poses serious
consequences in terms of safety.
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Fig. 4. Optimal cart attack.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION
The previous attack example in Section III-A demonstrates
that detecting attacks by simple limit checking does not
provide good results. In this section, a new detection method
is presented which does not directly depend on the controller
information.
The underlying idea is to figure out, given the current
system state, whether limit crossing can be predicted in
advance. Let Ud be a control sequence vector of length Nd,
i.e. Ud = [u(k), . . . , u(k +Nd − 1)]T , and Yd be the vector
of estimated outputs obtained from Ud, i.e.,
Yd = Gxx(k) + GuUd (11)
Where now, with an abuse of notation, matrices Gx and Gu
are build from an horizon of Nd steps. Then an attack is
detected as long as no possible Ud ∈ [U− U+] exists such
that
Yd ∈ [Y
− Y+] (12)
is satisfied for the given current state x(k). This is,
6 ∃Ud ∈ [U
− U+] : Yd ∈ [Y
− Y+]→ attack is detected.
Expression (11) requires the current system state which
can be determined by means of state observers. Once the
state (or its estimate) is available, the detection procedure
turns into a feasibility checking problem. In fact, finding
out if a feasible solution exist can be efficiently solved
by formulating a linear programing problem with null cost,
namely:
max
Ud
[
0 · · · 0
]
Ud (13a)
subject to: 

−Gu
Gu
−I
I

Ud ≤


−Y− + Gxx(k)
Y+ − Gxx(k)
−U−
U+

 (13b)
A. Example: cart attack detection
Consider again the cart system on which the presented
detector method will be applied for Nd = 40 (again, a larger
detection horizon does not improve the results, while with
a shorter horizon, the detection could be underestimated).
The detector performs the optimization described in (13) and
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Fig. 5. Cart attack detection.
checks whether a feasible solution is possible or not. The
results obtained from this new detection method are depicted
in Fig. 5.
Note that the attack is now detected at t = 7.6 seconds
when the cart position is y = 0.051 (rather far from the
limit) which makes the detection non-intuitive. In summary,
the attack is detected at this point by discovering that limit
crossing can no longer be avoided owing to the system states
(position and speed).
Subsequently, the same recovery strategy as before is
considered. Once the attack is detected, the attack is instantly
rejected and the PID controller takes over the control of the
system. Now, the recovery response is improved by reducing
the maximum distance to y = 9.2, however, this still does
not provide convincing results from a safety perspective.
V. ATTACK EFFECT MITIGATION
Detecting the attack in advance is not enough. Therefore,
advanced steps need to be taken in order to really preserve
the system from the attacks. In this section, an optimal
control sequence Um of length Nm is proposed to mitigate
the attack effect and bring the system back to a safety region.
In order to commit this goal with the maximum priority
no other control performances are sought. Thus, after the
control sequence Um has accomplished the goal, the backup
controller is connected in order to provide suitable control
performance as in the nominal (attack-free) case.
Let td be the time instant of the attack detection and x(td)
the corresponding system state at the detection instant. Then
the control sequence Um = [um(td) . . . um(td+Nm−1)]T
is computed by minimizing the system output y(td +Nm −
1) with the condition that limits should not be crossed.
However, according to the detectability principle described
in Section IV, this minimization problem would become
unfeasible since no limit crossing prevention is possible.
In this case, soft constraint formulation is used in order
to indicate that limit crossing is not desired but allowed.
According to this, the intended minimization problem is
formulated as
min
Um, ξ
yi(td +Nm − 1)
T yi(td +Nm − 1) + Γξ
2 (14a)
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such that:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bum(k) (14b)
y(k) = Cx(k) +Dum(k) (14c)
for k = {td, · · · , td +Nm − 1}
um(td), . . . ,ua(td +Nm − 1) ∈ [u
− u+] (14d)
y(td), . . . ,y(td +Nm − 1) ∈ [(y
−−ξ) (y++ξ)] (14e)
Observe that the variable ξ in (14) is a dummy variable
utilized to soften the constraints (14e). Hence, the weight
Γ in the cost function (14a) needs to be significantly greater
than the other terms.
The minimization problem can be reformulated by taking
into account that
y(td +Nm − 1) = Rx(td) + SUm (15)
where
R = CANm−1
S =
[
CANm−2B · · · CAB CB D
]
and again with an abuse of notation, we extend the outputs
obtained from Um by
Y = Gxx(td) + GuUm (16)
where now matrices Gx and Gu are build from an horizon of
Nm steps. Finally, the optimization problem in (14) is casted
as a quadratic program,
min
Um, ξ
UTmS
T
i SiUm + 2x(td)
TRTi SiUm+
+ x(td)
TRTi Rix(td) + Γξ
2 (17a)
subject to:

−Gu −1
Gu −1
−I 0
I 0


[
Ua
ξ
]
≤


−Y− + Gxx(td)
Y+ − Gxx(td)
−U−
U+

 (17b)
where Ri and Si denote the ith-row of the matrices R and
S. Matrix I is an identity matrix of dimension (Nm − 1),
while 1 and 0 denote a column vector of (Nm−1) ones and
zeros. Similar to before, Y−, Y+, U− and U+ are vectors
of the dimension (Nm − 1) containing the limit values y−,
y+ , u− and u+.
A. Example: cart attack effect mitigation
The optimization problem in (17) is solved for the cart
system after the attack is detected at td = 7.6 seconds,
according to Section IV-A. In this case, a time horizon
Nm = 50 and a weight Γ = 106 are chosen. The obtained
results are shown in Fig. 6 where now the maximum distance
is y = 5.68. The backup PID controller is connected at
t = 12.6 seconds, just after applying the optimal control
sequence Um that mitigates the effect of the attack.
Despite the fact that limit crossing is not avoided, the
response has significantly improved. As expected from the
maximum distance, the value of the dummy variable com-
puted for this example is ξ = 0.68, i.e. the exceeded
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Fig. 6. Cart attack effect mitigation.
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Fig. 7. Typical responses of the system and the controller.
distance. The limit exceedance can be modified by adjusting
the weight cost Γ. Remark that there exists an upper bound
where increasing Γ does not provide better results. Further-
more large values of Γ do not help on the convergence of
the optimization.
VI. UNSTABLE SYSTEM EXAMPLE
In order to show the potential of the attack detection
and mitigation methods presented in this paper, an unstable
system is used in this section as a test bed. The discrete state
space representation of the system is[
x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
]
=
[
1.1 −0.5
0.5 1.2
] [
x1(k)
x2(k)
]
+
[
−1
2
]
u(k)
(18a)
y(k) =
[
−1 2
] [ x1(k)
x2(k)
]
(18b)
The actuator limits for this example are defined as
[u− u+] = [−1.5 1.5] and the measurement safety limits
as [y− y+] = [−5 5]. The sample time is Ts = 0.1
seconds. An LQR controller has been designed in order to
stabilize and control the system, where the states of the
systems are assumed to be perfectly known. In Fig. 7, typical
responses of the attack-free system controlled by the LQR
are shown.
An optimal attack has been computed for Na = 8 and
Ne = 1. Using standard limit checking techniques to detect
the attack and protect the system is not feasible. Indeed,
as Fig. 8 shows, the attack destabilizes the system and the
backup controller is not able to recover it. Since the actuator
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Fig. 8. Optimal attack and detection with standard limit checking detector.
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Fig. 9. Attack detection and mitigation with the proposed strategy.
range is limited, the LQR controller can not guarantee
stability.
Finally, the proposed methods for attack detection and
attack effect mitigation are applied to the same scenario
as depicted in Fig. 8. In this case, the detector horizon is
Nd = 10 and the mitigation horizon Nm = 7. The detector
triggers an alarm at t = 0.3 seconds with enough time to
avoid system destabilization in advance. Then, the mitigation
action is applied and finally the LQR controller drives the
system to the desired state (see Fig. 9).
This example shows that, by applying the proposed meth-
ods, not only limit exceeding can be reduced but instability
can be prevented which is a major threat in real-word
dynamic systems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The paper shows that relying on standard monitoring
systems and backup controllers is not sufficient for system
security where planned attacks can be carried out. Therefore,
an early but comprehensive study based on optimization
techniques has been presented to set up secure control
systems. This study involves: worse-case attack analysis,
efficient attack detection and mitigation methods.
The present work has been developed from an industrial
perspective where the security system does not need to be
updated every time the controller is modified. Hence, it
is transparent to the control and plant engineers and less
vulnerable at the same time.
It is important to point out that the presented optimization
problems can be solved efficiently and thus performed on-
line. This is especially true for the detector case where a
feasibility problem needs to be solved at each sample time.
On the other hand, the mitigation control sequence Um is
computed at a very critical point when the attack is detected.
Note that the performance of the mitigation control sequence
is very aggressive since its goal is to reduce the effects of
the attack, thus it is not suitable for standard mode operation
where other performances may be required.
Although only linear models are used in this paper, the
results are satisfactory enough to be considered as basis for
future extensions. Further work needs to be done among
others, in the methodical selection of the time horizons
since the optimality of the solutions strongly depends on
it. Uncertainty of the system (e.g. noise, model inaccuracies,
communication delays) can also be taken into account as
possible extensions, where feedback control loops will be
needed.
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